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“What's your line of business, then?” 
“I'm a scholar of the Enlightenment,” said Nicholas. 
“Oh Lord!” the young man said. “Another producer of useless graduates!” 
Nicholas felt despondent. 
(Lukes 1995: 199) 
IN The Curious Enlightenment of Professor Caritat—Steven Lukes' fictionalized 
round-up of contemporary political theory—the hapless professor has been kidnapped 
by the resistance movement and sent off to search for grounds for optimism. In 
Utilitaria, he is asked to give a lecture on “Breaking Free from the Past;” in 
Communitaria, on “Why the Enlightenment Project Had to Fail.” Neither topic is 
much to his taste, but it is only when he reaches Libertaria (not, as one of its gloomy 
inhabitants tells him, a good place to be unlucky, unemployed, or employed by the 
state) that he is made to recognize the limited purchase of his academic expertise. At 
the end of the book, the professor still has not found the mythical land of Egalitaria. 
But he has derived one important lesson from his adventures: in the pursuit of any one 
ideal, it is disastrous to lose sight of all the others. 
 This Handbook is not organized around categories such as utilitarianism, 
communitarianism, or libertarianism, and though it also notes the continuing 
elusiveness of egalitarianism, it does not promote any single ideal. The Handbook 
seeks, instead, to reflect the pluralism of contemporary political theory, a pluralism 
we regard as a key feature and major strength of the field. In this introduction, we 
clarify what we understand by political theory, identify major themes and 
developments over recent decades, and take stock of the contemporary condition of 
the field. We end with an explanation of the categories through which we have 
organized the contributions to the Handbook. 
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1 WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY? 
Political Theory is an interdisciplinary endeavor whose center of gravity lies at the 
humanities end of the happily still undisciplined discipline of political science. Its 
traditions, approaches, and styles vary, but the field is united by a commitment to 
theorize, critique, and diagnose the norms, practices, and organization of political 
action in the past and present, in our own places and elsewhere. Across what 
sometimes seem chasms of difference, political theorists share a concern with the 
demands of justice and how to fulfill them, the presuppositions and promise of 
democracy, the divide between secular and religious ways of life, and the nature and 
identity of public goods, among many other topics. 
 Political theorists also share a commitment to the humanistic study of politics 
(although with considerable disagreement over what that means), and a skepticism 
towards the hegemony sometimes sought by our more self-consciously “scientific” 
colleagues. In recent years, and especially in the USA, the study of politics has 
become increasingly formal and quantitative. Indeed, there are those for whom 
political theory, properly understood, would be formal theory geared solely towards 
the explanation of political phenomena, where explanation is modeled on the natural 
sciences and takes the form of seeking patterns and offering causal explanations for 
events in the human world. Such approaches have been challenged—most recently by 
the Perestroika movement (Monroe 2005)—on behalf of more qualitative and 
interpretive approaches. Political theory is located at one remove from this 
quantitative vs. qualitative debate, sitting somewhere between the distanced 
universals of normative philosophy and the empirical world of politics. 
 For a long time, the challenge for the identity of political theory has been how to 
position itself productively in three sorts of location: in relation to the academic 
disciplines of political science, history, and philosophy; between the world of politics 
and the more abstract, ruminative register of theory; between canonical political 
theory and the newer resources (such as feminist and critical theory, discourse 
analysis, film and film theory, popular and political culture, mass media studies, 
neuroscience, environmental studies, behavioral science, and economics) on which 
political theorists increasingly draw. Political theorists engage with empirical work in 
politics, economics, sociology, and law to inform their reflections, and there have 
been plenty of productive associations between those who call themselves political 
scientists and those who call themselves political theorists. The connection to law is 
strongest when it comes to constitutional law and its normative foundations (for 
example, Sunstein 1993; Tully 1995, 2002; this connection is covered in our chapters 
by Stimson and by Ferejohn and Pasquino). 
 Most of political theory has an irreducibly normative component—regardless of 
whether the theory is systematic or diagnostic in its approach, textual or cultural in its 
focus, analytic, critical, genealogical, or deconstructive in its method, ideal or 
piecemeal in its procedures, socialist, liberal, or conservative in its politics. The field 
welcomes all these approaches. It has a core canon, often referred to as Plato to 
NATO, although the canon is itself unstable, with the rediscovery of figures such as 
Sophocles, Thucydides, Baruch Spinoza, and Mary Wollstonecraft, previously treated 
as marginal, and the addition of new icons such as Hannah Arendt, John Rawls, 
Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. Moreover, the subject matter of political 
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theory has always extended beyond this canon and its interpretations, as theorists 
bring their analytic tools to bear on novels, film, and other cultural artifacts, and on 
developments in other social sciences and even in natural science. 
 Political theory is an unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline, with no dominant 
methodology or approach. When asked to describe themselves, theorists will 
sometimes employ the shorthand of a key formative influence—as in “I'm a 
Deleuzean,” or Rawlsian, or Habermasian, or Arendtian—although it is probably 
more common to be labeled in this way by others than to claim the description 
oneself. In contrast, however, to some neighboring producers of knowledge, political 
theorists do not readily position themselves by reference to three or four dominant 
schools that define their field. There is, for example, no parallel to the division 
between realists, liberals, and constructivists, recently joined by neoconservatives, 
that defines international relations theory. And there is certainly nothing like the old 
Marx–Weber–Durkheim triad that was the staple of courses in sociological theory up 
to the 1970s. 
 Because of this, political theory can sometimes seem to lack a core identity. Some 
practitioners seek to rectify the perceived lack, either by putting political theory back 
into what is said to be its proper role as arbiter of universal questions and explorer of 
timeless texts, or by returning the focus of political theory to history. The majority, 
however, have a strong sense of their vocation. Many see the internally riven and 
uncertain character of the field as reflective of the internally riven and uncertain 
character of the political world in which we live, bringing with it all the challenges 
and promises of that condition. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, 
liberal, critical, and post-structuralist theorists have (in their very different ways) 
responded to the breakdown of old assumptions about the unitary nature of nation-
state identities. They have rethought the presuppositions and meanings of identity, 
often rejecting unitary conceptions and moving towards more pluralistic, diverse, or 
agonistic conceptions in their place. These reflections have had an impact on the 
field's own self-perception and understanding. Happily for political theory, the 
process has coincided with a movement within the academy to reconceive knowledge 
as more fundamentally interdisciplinary. This reconsideration of the function and role 
of the boundaries of the academic disciplines may help others, as well as political 
theorists, to see the field's pluralism as a virtue and a strength, rather than a weakness 
in need of rectification. 
1.1 Relationship with Political Science 
Political theory's relationship to the discipline of political science has not always been 
a happy one. Since the founding of the discipline in the late nineteenth century, there 
have been periodic proclamations of its newly scientific character. The “soft” other 
for the new science has sometimes been journalism, sometimes historical narrative, 
sometimes case-study methods. It has also, very often, been political theory. 
Beginning in the 1950s, behavioral revolutionaries tried to purge the ranks of 
theorists—and had some success at this in one or two large Midwestern departments 
of political science in the USA. The later impact of rational choice theory encouraged 
others, like William Riker (1982a: 753), to reject “belles letters, criticism, and 
philosophic speculation” along with “phenomenology and hermeneutics.” For those 
driven by their scientific aspirations, it has always been important to distinguish the 
 5 
“true” scientific study of politics from more humanistic approaches—and political 
theory has sometimes borne the brunt of this. 
 Political theorists have noted, in response, that science and objectivity are steeped 
in a normativity that the self-proclaimed scientists wrongly disavow; and theorists 
have not been inclined to take the description of political “science” at face value. 
They have challenged the idea that their own work in normative theory lacks rigor, 
pointing to criteria within political theory that differentiate more from less rigorous 
work. While resisting the epistemic assumptions of empiricism, many also point out 
that much of what passes for political theory is profoundly engaged with empirical 
politics: what, after all, could be more “real”, vital, and important than the symbols 
and categories that organize our lives and the frameworks of our understanding? The 
French have a word to describe what results when those elected as president and 
prime minister are representatives of two different political parties: cohabitation. The 
word connotes, variously, cooperation, toleration, sufferance, antagonism, and a sense 
of common enterprise. Cohabitation, in this sense, is a good way to cast the 
relationship between political theory and political science. 
1.2 Relationship with History 
History as a point of reference has also proven contentious, with recurrent debates 
about the extent to which theory is contained by its historical context (see Pocock and 
Farr in this volume), and whether one can legitimately employ political principles 
from one era as a basis for criticizing political practice in another. When Quentin 
Skinner, famous for his commitment to historical contextualism, suggested that early 
principles of republican freedom might offer a telling alternative to the conceptions of 
liberty around today, he took care to distance himself from any suggestion that 
“intellectual historians should turn themselves into moralists” (Skinner 1998: 118). 
He still drew criticism for abandoning the historian's traditional caution. 
 In an essay published in 1989, Richard Ashcraft called upon political theorists to 
acknowledge the fundamentally historical character of their enterprise. While 
contemporary theorists recognize the “basic social/historical conditions which 
structure” their practice, “this recognition does not serve as a conscious guideline for 
their teaching and writing of political theory.” Ashcraft continued: “On the contrary, 
political theory is taught and written about as if it were great philosophy rather than 
ideology” (Ashcraft 1989: 700). For Ashcraft, acknowledging the ideological 
character of political theory meant embracing its political character. The main objects 
of his critique were Leo Strauss and his followers, whom Ashcraft saw as seeking 
evidence of universally valid standards in canonical political theorists and calling on 
those standards to judge their works. For Straussians, the wisdom of the ancients and 
greats is outside history. 
 Ashcraft also criticized Sheldon Wolin, who shared Ashcraft's displeasure with 
Straussians, on the grounds of their inadequate attention to politics (see Saxonhouse's 
contribution to this volume). Although Wolin acknowledged the historicity of the 
texts he had examined in his seminal Politics and Vision (1960), Ashcraft claimed that 
Wolin resisted the “wholesale transformation” that would result, in both his view and 
Ashcraft's, from putting that historicity at the center of his interpretative practice. 
Wolin is famous for championing what, in the style of Hannah Arendt, he termed “the 
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political:” politics understood, not in its instrumental capacity (Harold Lasswell's 
(1961) “‘Who gets what, when, and how’”), but rather in its orientation toward the 
public good coupled with a commitment to the “public happiness” of political 
participation. Contra Ashcraft, one might see Wolin's move to the political as a way of 
splitting the difference between a Straussian universalism and the thick contextualism 
of Ashcraft's preferred historicist approach. 
  “The political” is a conceptual category, itself outside of history, that rejects the 
idea that politics is about universal truths, while also rejecting the reduction of politics 
to interests. “The political” tends to connote, minimally, some form of individual or 
collective action that disrupts ordinary states of affairs, normal life, or routine patterns 
of behavior or governance. There are diverse conceptions of this notion. To take three 
as exemplary: the political takes its meaning from its figuration in Wolin's work by 
contrast primarily with statism, constitutionalism, and political apathy; in Arendt's 
work by contrast with private or natural spheres of human behavior; and in Ranciere's 
(1999) work by contrast with the “police.” 
1.3 Relationship with Philosophy 
The most un-historical influence on political theory in recent decades has been John 
Rawls, whose work represents a close alliance with analytic philosophy. On one 
popular account, Rawls arrived from outside as political theory's foreign savior and 
rescued political theory from the doldrums with the publication in 1971 of A Theory 
of Justice (see Arneson in this volume). Rawls' book was an ambitious, normative, 
and systematic investigation of what political, economic, and social justice should 
look like in contemporary democracies. With the distancing mechanisms of a veil of 
ignorance and hypothetical social contract, Rawls followed Kant in looking to reason 
to adjudicate what he saw as the fundamental question of politics: the conflict 
between liberty and equality. Writing from within the discipline of philosophy, he 
returned political theory to one of its grand styles (Tocqueville's two-volume 
Democracy in America, also written by an outsider, would represent another). Much 
subsequent work on questions of justice and equality has continued in this vein, and 
while those who have followed Rawls have not necessarily shared his conclusions, 
they have often employed similar mind experiments to arrive at the appropriate 
relationship between equality and choice. The clamshell auction imagined by Ronald 
Dworkin (1981), where all the society's resources are up for sale and the participants 
employ their clamshells to bid for what best suits their own projects in life, is another 
classic illustration. Starting with what seems the remotest of scenarios, Dworkin 
claims to arrive at very specific recommendations for the contemporary welfare state. 
 As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, one strand of current debates in 
political theory revolves around the relationship between the more abstracted or 
hypothetical register of analytic philosophy and approaches that stress the specificities 
of historical or contemporary contexts. Those working in close association with the 
traditions of analytic philosophy—and often preferring to call themselves political 
philosophers—have generated some of the most interesting and innovative work in 
recent decades. But they have also been repeatedly challenged. Communitarians and 
post-structuralists claim that the unencumbered individual of Rawlsian liberalism is 
not neutral but an ideological premise with significant, unacknowledged political 
effects on its theoretical conclusions (Sandel 1982; Honig 1993). Feminists criticize 
 7 
the analytic abstraction from bodily difference as a move that reinforces 
heteronormative assumptions and gender inequalities (Okin 1989; Pateman 1988; 
Zerilli and Gatens in this volume). As we indicate later in the introduction, analytic 
liberalism has made some considerable concessions in this regard. In Political 
Liberalism, for example, Rawls no longer represents his theory of justice as 
addressing what is right for all societies at all times, but is careful to present his 
arguments as reflecting the intuitions of contemporary liberal and pluralistic societies. 
1.4 Relationship with “Real World” Politics 
The way political theory positions itself in relation to political science, history, and 
philosophy can be read in part as reflections on the meaning of the political. It can 
also be read as reflections on the nature of theory, and what can—or cannot—be 
brought into existence through theoretical work. The possibilities are bounded on one 
side by utopianism. Political theorists have seemed at their most vulnerable to 
criticism by political scientists or economists when their normative explorations 
generate conclusions that cannot plausibly be implemented: principles of living, 
perhaps, that invoke the practices of small-scale face-to-face societies; the or 
principles of distribution that ignore the implosion of communism or the seemingly 
irresistible global spread of consumerist ideas (see Dunn 2000, for one such warning). 
There is an important strand in political theory that relishes the utopian label, 
regarding this as evidence of the capacity to think beyond current confines, the 
political theorist's version of blue-sky science. Ever since Aristotle, however, this has 
been challenged by an insistence on working within the parameters of the possible, an 
insistence often called “sober” by those who favor it. At issue here is not the status of 
political theory in relation to political science, but how theory engages with 
developments in the political world. 
 Some see it as failing to do so. John Gunnell (1986) has represented political theory 
as alienated from politics, while Jeffrey Isaac (1995) argues that a reader of political 
theory journals in the mid 1990s would have had no idea that the Berlin Wall had 
fallen. Against this, one could cite a flurry of studies employing empirical results to 
shed light on the real-world prospects for the kind of deliberative democracy currently 
advocated by democratic theorists (see for example the 2005 double issue of Acta 
Politica); or testing out theories of justice by reference to empirical studies of social 
mobility (Marshall, Swift, and Roberts 1997). Or one might take note of the rather 
large number of political theorists whose interest in contemporary political events 
such as the formation of a European identity, the new international human-rights 
regime and the politics of immigration, the eschewal of the Geneva Convention at the 
turn of the twentieth century, or the appropriate political response to natural disasters 
leads them to think about how to theorize these events. Concepts or figures of thought 
invoked here include Giorgio Agamben's (1998) “bare life” of the human being to 
whom anything can be done by the state, Michel Foucault's (1979) “disciplinary 
power” that conditions what people can think, Carl Schmitt's (1985) “state of 
exception” wherein the sovereign suspends the rule of law, Ronald Dworkin's (1977) 
superhuman judge “Hercules,” Jacques Derrida's (2000) “unconditional hospitality” to 
the other, or Etienne Balibar's (2004) “marks of sovereignty” which signal the 
arrogation to themselves by political actors in civil society of rights and privileges of 
action historically assumed by states. 
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 As is clear from the contributions in this Handbook, political theorists take their cue 
from events around them, turning their attention to the challenges presented by 
ecological crisis; emergency or security politics; the impact of new technologies on 
the ways we think about privacy, justice, or the category of the human; the impact of 
new migrations on ideas of race, tolerance, and multiculturalism; the implications of 
growing global inequalities on the way we theorize liberty, equality, democracy, 
sovereignty, or hegemony. In identifying the topics for this collection, we have been 
struck by the strong sense of political engagement in contemporary political theory, 
and the way this shapes the field. 
1.5 Institutional Landscape 
Institutionally, political theory is located in several disciplines, starting of course with 
political science, but continuing through philosophy and law, and including some 
representation in departments of history, sociology, and economics. This means that 
the professional associations and journals of these disciplines are hospitable (if to 
varying degrees) to work in political theory. Among the general political science 
journals, it is quite common to find political theory published in Polity and Political 
Studies, somewhat less so in the American Journal of Political Science, British 
Journal of Political Science, and Journal of Politics. On the face of it, the American 
Political Science Review publishes a substantial number of political theory articles, 
but the majority of these have been in the history of political thought, with Straussian 
authors especially well represented. In philosophy, Ethics and Philosophy and Public 
Affairs are the two high-profile journals most likely to publish political theory. Some 
of the more theoretically inclined law journals publish political theory, and so do 
some of the more politically inclined sociology journals. 
 Political theory's best-established journal of its own is Political Theory, founded in 
1972. Prior to its establishment, the closest we had to a general political-theory 
academic periodical were two book series. The first was the sporadic Philosophy, 
Politics and Society series published by Basil Blackwell and always co-edited by 
Peter Laslett, beginning in 1956 and reaching its seventh volume in 2003. Far more 
regularly published have been the NOMOS yearbooks of the American Society for 
Political and Legal Philosophy, which began in 1958 and continue to this day. Recent 
years have seen an explosion in political theory journal titles: History of Political 
Thought; Journal of Political Philosophy; The Good Society; Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics; Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy; 
European Journal of Political Theory; Contemporary Political Theory; 
Constellations; and Theory and Event (an online journal). The Review of Politics has 
been publishing since 1939, although its coverage has been selective, with a 
Straussian emphasis for much of its history. Political theorists can often be found 
publishing in related areas such as feminism, law, international relations, or cultural 
studies. Journals that feature their work from these various interdisciplinary locations 
include differences; Politics, Culture, and Society; Daedalus; Social Text; Logos; 
Strategies; Signs; and Millennium. However, political theory is a field very much 
oriented to book publication (a fact which artificially depresses the standing of 
political theory journals when computed from citation indexes, for even journal 
articles in the field tend to cite books rather than other articles). All the major English-
language academic presses publish political theory. Oxford University Press's Oxford 
Political Theory series is especially noteworthy. While the world of the Internet 
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changes rapidly, at the time of writing the Political Theory Daily Review is an 
excellent resource that opens many doors.1 
 Political theory is much in evidence at meetings of disciplinary associations. The 
Foundations of Political Theory section of the American Political Science Association 
is especially important, not just in organizing panels and lectures and sponsoring 
awards but also in hosting what is for a couple of hours every year probably the 
largest number of political theorists in one room talking at once (the Foundations 
reception). The field also has associations of its own that sponsor conferences: the 
Conference for the Study of Political Thought International, and the Association for 
Political Theory (both based in North America). In the UK, there is an annual Political 
Theory conference in Oxford; and though the European Consortium for Political 
Research has tended to focus more on comparative studies, it also provides an 
important context for workshops on political theory. 
2 CONTEMPORARY THEMES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
As befits a relentlessly critical field, political theory is prone to self-examination. We 
have already noted controversies over its relationship to various disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary landscapes. Occasionally the self-examination takes a morbid turn, 
with demise or death at issue: the most notorious example being when Laslett (1956) 
claimed in his introduction to the 1956 Philosophy, Politics and Society book series 
that the tradition of political theory was broken, and the practice dead. Even the field's 
defenders have at times detected only a faint pulse. 
 Concerns about the fate of theory peaked in the 1950s and 1960s with the 
ascendancy of behavioralism in US political science. Such worries were 
circumvented, but not finally ended, by the flurry of political and philosophical 
activity in the USA around the Berkeley Free Speech movement (with which Sheldon 
Wolin 1969, and John Schaar 1970, were associated), the Civil Rights movement 
(Arendt 1959), and protests against the Vietnam war and the US military draft 
(Walzer 1967, 1970). At that moment, the legitimacy of the state, the limits of 
obligation, the nature of justice, and the claims of conscience in politics were more 
than theoretical concerns. Civil disobedience was high on political theory's agenda.2 
Members of activist networks read and quoted Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, and 
others in support of their actions and visions of politics. 
 Throughout the 1960s, the struggle over the fate of theory was entwined with 
questions about what counted as politics and how to find a political-theoretical space 
between or outside liberalism and Marxism. It was against this political and 
theoretical background that John Rawls was developing the ideas gathered together in 
systematic form in A Theory of Justice (1971), a book devoted to the examination of 
themes that the turbulent 1960s had made so prominent: redistributive policies, 
                                                 
 1 http: //www.politicaltheory.info/ 
 
 2 See notably Marcuse's “Repressive Tolerance” contribution in Wolff, Moore, and 
Marcuse (1965), Pitkin (1966), Dworkin (1968), the essay on “Civil Disobedience” in 
Arendt (1969), and Rawls (1969). 
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conscientious objection, and the legitimacy of state power. Later in that decade 
Quentin Skinner and a new school of contextualist history of political thought (known 
as the Cambridge school) rose to prominence in the English-speaking world. Still 
other works of political theory from this period give the lie to the idea that political 
theory was in need of rescue or revivification. The following stand out, and in some 
cases remain influential: Leo Strauss's Natural Right and History (1953), Louis 
Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), Karl Popper's The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957), Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition (1958) and On 
Revolution (1963), Sheldon Wolin's Politics and Vision (1960), Friedrich A. von 
Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty (1960), Michael Oakeshott's Rationalism in 
Politics (1962), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consent 
(1962), Judith Shklar's Legalism (1964), Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man 
(1964), Brian Barry's Political Argument (1964), and Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on 
Liberty (1969). 
2.1 Liberalism and its Critics 
Looking at the field from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first 
century, there is certainly no indication of political theory failing in its vitality: this is 
a time of energetic and expansive debate, with new topics crowding into an already 
busy field. For many in political theory, including many critics of liberal theory, this 
pluralistic activity obscures a more important point: the dominance that has been 
achieved by liberalism, at least in the Anglo-American world. In its classic guise, 
liberalism assumes that individuals are for the most part motivated by self-interest, 
and regards them as the best judges of what this interest requires. In its most confident 
variants, it sees the material aspects of interest as best realized through exchange in a 
market economy, to the benefit of all. Politics enters when interests cannot be so met 
to mutual benefit. Politics is therefore largely about how to reconcile and aggregate 
individual interests, and takes place under a supposedly neutral set of constitutional 
rules. Given that powerful individuals organized politically into minorities or 
majorities can turn public power to their private benefit, checks across different 
centers of power are necessary, and constitutional rights are required to protect 
individuals against government and against one another. These rights are 
accompanied by obligations on the part of their holders to respect rights held by 
others, and duties to the government that establishes and protects rights. Liberalism so 
defined leaves plenty of scope for dispute concerning the boundaries of politics, 
political intervention in markets, political preference aggregation and conflict 
resolution mechanisms, and the content of rights, constitutions, obligations, and 
duties. There is, for example, substantial distance between the egalitarian disposition 
of Rawls and the ultra-individualistic libertarianism of Robert Nozick (1974).3 
Liberalism's conception of politics clearly differs, however, from the various 
conceptions of the political deployed by Arendt, Wolin, Ranciere, and others, as well 
as from republican conceptions of freedom explored by Quentin Skinner (1998) or 
Philip Pettit (1997). 
                                                 
 3 Other important works in the vast liberal justice literature include Gauthier 
(1986), Barry (1995), and Scanlon (1998). 
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 In earlier decades, liberalism had a clear comprehensive competitor in the form of 
Marxism, not just in the form of real-world governments claiming to be Marxist, but 
also in political theory. Marxism scorned liberalism's individualist ontology, pointing 
instead to the centrality of social classes in political conflict. The market was seen not 
as a mechanism for meeting individual interests, but as a generator of oppression and 
inequality (as well as undeniable material progress). Marxism also rejected 
liberalism's static and ahistorical account of politics in favor of an analysis of history 
driven by material forces that determined what individuals were and could be in 
different historical epochs. Different versions of this were hotly debated in the 1970s, 
as theorists positioned themselves behind the “humanist” Marx, revealed in his earlier 
writings on alienation (McLellan 1970),4 or the “Althusserian” Marx, dealing in social 
relations and forces of production (Althusser 1969; Althusser and Balibar 1970). 
Disagreements between these schools were intense, although both proclaimed the 
superiority of Marxist over liberal thought. In the period that followed, however, the 
influence of academic Marxism in the English-speaking world waned. The fortunes of 
Marxist theory were not helped by the demise of the Soviet bloc in 1989–91, and the 
determined pursuit of capitalism in China under the leadership of a nominally Marxist 
regime. 
 Questions remain about liberalism's success in defeating or replacing this rival. One 
way to think of subsequent developments is to see a strand from both liberalism and 
Marxism as being successfully appropriated by practitioners of analytic philosophy, 
such as Rawls and G. A. Cohen (1978). Focusing strictly on Marxism vs. liberalism, 
however, threatens to obscure the presence of other vigorous alternatives, from 
alternative liberalisms critical (sometimes implicitly) of Rawlsianism, such as those 
developed by Richard Flathman (1992), George Kateb (1992), Jeremy Waldron 
(1993), and William Galston (1991), to alternative Marxisms such as those explored 
by Jacques Ranciere (1989) and Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991), 
and Nancy Hartsock (1983). Michael Rogin combined the insights of Marxism and 
Freudian psychoanalysis to generate work now considered canonical to American 
studies and cultural studies (though he himself was critical of that set of approaches; 
see Dean's essay in this Handbook). Rogin (1987) pressed for the centrality of race, 
class, property, and the unconscious to the study of American politics (on race, see 
also Mills 1997). 
 Liberal theory's assumptions about power and individualism were criticized or 
bypassed from still other perspectives through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, a fecund 
period during which political theorists had a wide range of approaches and languages 
from which to choose in pursuit of their work. In France, social theorists writing in 
the 1970s (in the aftermath of May 1968) included, most famously, Michel Foucault, 
whose re-theorization of power had a powerful influence on generations of American 
theorists. In Germany, a discursive account of politics developed by Jürgen Habermas 
(for example, 1989, first published in German 1962) captured the imaginations of a 
generation of critical theorists committed to developing normative standards through 
                                                 
 4 See also the work of the US-Yugoslav Praxis group, and their now-defunct 
journal Praxis International. 
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which to assess the claims of liberal democratic states to legitimacy. The 1970s Italian 
Autonomia movement inspired new Gramscian and Foucaultian reflections on 
equality, politics, violence, and state power (Virno 2004). For much of this period, 
feminism defined itself almost as an opposite of liberalism, drawing inspiration 
initially from Marxism, later from psychoanalytic theories of difference, and 
developing its own critique of the abstract individual. In Canada and at Oxford, 
Charles Taylor (1975) was thinking about politics through a rereading of Hegel that 
stressed the importance of community to political autonomy, influencing Michael 
Sandel (1982) and many subsequent theorists of multiculturalism. Deleuze and 
Guattari combined post-structuralism and psychoanalyisis into a series of difficult 
ruminations on the spatial metaphors that organize our thinking at the ontological 
level about politics, nature, and life (1977; see also Patton in this volume). Ranging 
from Freudian to Lacanian approaches, psychoanalysis has provided political theorists 
with a perspective from which to examine the politics of mass society, race and 
gender inequalities, and personal and political identity (Butler 1993; Laclau 2006; 
Zizek 2001; Irigara 1985; Zerilli 1994; Glass in this volume). 
2.2 Liberal Egalitarianism 
As the above suggests, alternatives to liberalism continue to proliferate, and yet, in 
many areas of political theory, liberalism has become the dominant position. Marxism 
has continued to inform debates on exploitation and equality, but in a shift that has 
been widely replayed through the last twenty-five years, reinvented itself to give more 
normative and analytic weight to the individual (Roemer 1982, 1986; Cohen 1995, 
2000). There has been a particularly significant convergence, therefore, in the debates 
around equality, with socialists unexpectedly preoccupied with questions of individual 
responsibility and desert, liberals representing equality rather than liberty as the 
“sovereign virtue” (Dworkin 2000), and the two combining to make liberal 
egalitarianism almost the only remaining tradition of egalitarianism. One intriguing 
outcome is the literature on basic income or basic endowment, which all individuals 
would receive from government to facilitate their participation in an otherwise liberal 
society (van Parijs 1995; Ackerman and Alstott 1999). 
 For generations, liberalism had been taken to task for what was said to be its 
“formal” understanding of equality: its tendency to think that there were no particular 
resource implications attached to human equality. In the wake of Rawls's “difference 
principle” (see Arneson in this volume) or Dworkin's “equality of resources” (see 
Williams in this volume), this now seems a singularly inappropriate complaint. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Amartya Sen posed a question that was to frame much of the 
literature on distributive justice through the next decade: equality of what? This 
generated a multiplicity of answers, ranging through welfare, resources, capabilities 
(Sen's preferred candidate), to the more cumbersome “equality of ‘opportunity’ for 
welfare,” and “equality of access to advantage.”5 None of the answers could be 
dismissed as representing a merely formal understanding of equality, but all engaged 
                                                 
 5 Key contributions to this debate include Sen (1980, 1992); Dworkin (1981, 
2000); Arneson (1989); and G. A. Cohen (1989). 
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with key liberal themes of individuality and responsibility. The subsequent explosion 
of liberal egalitarianism can be read as a radicalization of the liberal tradition. But the 
convergence between what were once distinctively liberal and socialist takes on 
equality can also be seen as demonstrating the new dominance of liberal theory. Much 
of the literature on equality is now resolutely individualist in form, running its 
arguments through thought experiments designed to tease out our intuitions of 
equality, and illustrating with stories of differently endowed individuals, exhibiting 
different degrees of aspiration and effort, whose entitlements we are then asked to 
assess. It is not always clear what purchase this discourse of individual variation (with 
a cast of characters including opera singers, wine buffs, surfers, and fishermen) has on 
the larger inequalities of the contemporary world. “What,” as Elizabeth Anderson has 
asked, “has happened to the concerns of the politically oppressed? What about 
inequalities of race, gender, class, and caste?” (Anderson 1999, 288). 
 In the course of the 1990s, a number of theorists voiced concern about the way 
issues of redistribution were being displaced by issues of recognition, casting matters 
of economic inequality into the shade (Fraser 1997; also Markell and Squires in this 
volume). There is considerable truth to this observation, but it would be misleading to 
say that no one now writes about economic inequality. There is, on the contrary, a 
large literature (and a useful web site, The Equality Exchange6) dealing with these 
issues. The more telling point is that the egalitarian literature has become increasingly 
focused around questions of individual responsibility, opportunity, and endowment, 
thus less engaged with social structures of inequality, and less easily distinguishable 
from liberalism. 
2.3 Communitarianism 
One central axis of contention in the 1980s was what came to be known as the liberal–
communitarian debate (for an overview, see Mulhall and Swift 1996). 
Communitarians like Michael Sandel (1982), influenced by both Arendt and Taylor, 
argued that in stressing abstract individuals and their rights as the building blocks for 
political theory, liberalism missed the importance of the community that creates 
individuals as they actually exist. For communitarians, individuals are always 
embedded in a network of social relationships, never the social isolates that liberalism 
assumes, and they have obligations to the community, not just to the political 
arrangements that facilitate their own interests. This opposition between the liberal's 
stripped-down, rights-bearing individual and the communitarian's socially-embedded 
bearer of obligations seemed, for a period, the debate in political philosophy. But 
voices soon made themselves heard arguing that this was a storm in a teacup, a debate 
within liberalism rather than between liberalism and its critics, the main question 
being the degree to which holistic notions of community are instrumental to the rights 
and freedoms that both sides in the debate prized (Taylor 1989; Walzer 1990; Galston 
1991). Liberalism, it is said, was misrepresented. Its conception of the individual was 
never as atomistic, abstracted, or self-interested, as its critics tried to suggest. 
                                                 




In the 1980s, feminists had mostly positioned themselves as critics of both schools. 
They shared much of the communitarian skepticism about disembedded individuals, 
and brought to this an even more compelling point about the abstract individual being 
disembodied, as if it made no difference whether “he” were female or male (Pateman 
1988; also Gatens in this volume). But they also warned against the authoritarian 
potential in holistic notions of community, and the way these could be wielded against 
women (e.g. Frazer and Lacey 1993). Growing numbers challenged impartialist 
conceptions of justice, arguing for a contextual ethics that recognizes the 
responsibilities individuals have for one another and/or the differences in our social 
location (Gilligan 1982; Young 1990; Mendus in this volume). Still others warned 
against treating the language of justice and rights as irredeemably masculine, and 
failing, as a result, to defend the rights of women (Okin 1989). 
 As the above suggests, feminism remained a highly diverse body of thought 
through the 1980s and 1990s; but to the extent that there was a consensus, it was 
largely critical of the liberal tradition, which was represented as overly individualistic, 
wedded to a strong public/private divide, and insufficiently alert to gender issues. 
There has since been a discernible softening in this critique, and this seems to reflect a 
growing conviction that liberalism is not as dependent on the socially isolated self as 
had been suggested. Nussbaum (1999: 62) argues that liberal individualism “does not 
entail either egoism or normative self-sufficiency;” and while feminists writing on 
autonomy have developed their own distinctive understanding of “relational 
autonomy,” many now explicitly repudiate the picture of mainstream liberal theory as 
ignoring the social nature of the self (see essays in MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000). 
Some of the earlier feminist critiques overstated the points of difference with 
liberalism, misrepresenting the individual at the heart of the tradition as more self-
contained, self-interested, and self-centered than was necessarily the case. But it also 
seems that liberalism made some important adjustments and in the process met at 
least part of the feminist critique. It would be churlish to complain of this (when you 
criticize a tradition, you presumably hope it will mend its ways), but one is left, once 
again, with a sense of a tradition mopping up its erstwhile opponents. Some forms of 
feminism are committed to a radical politics of sexual difference that it is hard to 
imagine liberalism ever wanting or claiming (see Zerilli in this volume). But many 
brands of feminism that were once critical of liberalism have made peace with the 
liberal tradition. 
2.5 Democracy and Critical Theory 
In the literature on citizenship and democracy, liberalism has faced a number of 
critical challenges, but here, too, some of the vigor of that challenge seems to have 
dispersed. Republicanism predates liberalism by two thousand years (see Nelson in 
this volume), and emphasises active citizenship, civic virtue, and the pursuit of public 
values, not the private interests associated more with the liberal tradition. 
Republicanism enjoyed a significant revival through the 1980s and 1990s as one of 
the main alternatives to liberal democracy (Sunstein 1990; Pettit 1997); indeed, it 
looked, for a time, as if it might substitute for socialism as the alternative to the liberal 
tradition. Nowadays, even the republican Richard Dagger (2004: 175) allows that “a 
republican polity must be able to count on a commitment to principles generally 
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associated with liberalism, such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the rights of 
others;” this is not, in other words, a total alternative. Deliberative democracy also 
emerged in the early 1990s as a challenge to established liberal models that regarded 
politics as the aggregation of preferences defined mostly in a private realm (J. Cohen 
1989). For deliberative democrats, reflection upon preferences in a public forum was 
central; and again, it looked as though this would require innovative thinking about 
alternative institutional arrangements that would take democracies beyond the 
standard liberal repertoire (Dryzek 1990). By the late 1990s, however, the very 
institutions that deliberative democrats had once criticized became widely seen as the 
natural home for deliberation, with an emphasis on courts and legislatures. Prominent 
liberals such as Rawls (1997, 771–2) proclaimed themselves deliberative democrats, 
and while Bohman (1998) celebrates this transformation as “the coming of age of 
deliberative democracy,” it also seems like another swallowing up of critical 
alternatives. 
 The recent history of critical theory—and more specifically, the work of Jürgen 
Habermas—is exemplary in this respect. Critical theory's ancestry extends back via 
the Frankfurt School to Marx. In the hands of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
(1972; first published 1947) in particular, critique was directed at dominant forms of 
instrumental rationality that defined modern society. Habermas rescued this critique 
from a potential dead end by showing that a communicative conception of rationality 
could underwrite a more congenial political order and associated emancipatory 
projects. Habermas's theory of the state was originally that of a monolith under sway 
of instrumental reason in the service of capitalism, which had to be resisted. Yet come 
the 1990s, Habermas (1996) had redefined himself as a constitutionalist stressing the 
role of rights in establishing the conditions for open discourse in the public sphere, 
whose democratic task was to influence political institutions that could come straight 
from a liberal democratic textbook (see Scheuerman in this volume). 
2.6 Green Political Theory 
Green political theory began in the 1970s, generating creative proposals for 
ecologically defensible alternatives to liberal capitalism. The center of gravity was 
left-libertarianism verging on eco-anarchism (Bookchin 1982), although (at least in 
the 1970s) some more Hobbesian and authoritarian voices were raised (Ophuls 1977). 
All could agree that liberal individualism and capitalist economic growth were 
antithetical to any sustainable political ecology. In his chapter, Meyer charts the 
progress of “post-exuberant” ecological political theory, characterized by engagement 
with liberalism. Not all green theory has moved in this direction. For example, 
Bennett and Chaloupka (1993) work more in the traditions of Thoreau and Foucault, 
while Plumwood (2002) draws on radical ecology and feminism to criticize the 
dualisms and anthropocentric rationalism of liberalism. 
2.7 Post-structuralism 
Post-structuralism is often seen as merely critical rather than constructive. This 
mistaken impression comes from a focus on the intersections between post-
structuralist theory and liberal theory. Some post-structuralist theorists seek to 
supplement rather than supplant liberalism, to correct its excesses, or even to give it a 
conscience that, in the opinion of many, it too often seems to lack. Hence Patton's 
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suggestion (in this volume) that the distance between post-structuralist and liberal 
political theory may not be as unbridgeable as is commonly conceived. And some 
versions of liberal theory are more likely to be embraced or explored by post-
structuralists than others: Isaiah Berlin, Richard Flathman, Jeremy Waldron, and 
Stuart Hampshire are all liberals whose work has been attended to in some detail by 
post-structuralist thinkers. 
 But post-structuralists have also developed alternative models of politics and ethics 
not directly addressed to liberal theory. One way to canvas those is with reference to 
the varying grand narratives on offer from this side of the field. Post-structuralism is 
often defined as intrinsically hostile to any sort of grand narrative, a claim attributed 
to Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984). This claim is belied by a great deal of work in the 
field that does not so much reject grand narrative as reimagine and reiterate it 
(Bennett 2002). Post-structuralists do reject foundational meta-narratives: those that 
present themselves as transcendentally true, for which nature or history has an 
intrinsic purpose, or that entail a two-world metaphysic. Those post-structuralists who 
do use meta-narratives tend to see themselves as writing in the tradition of social 
contract theorists like Hobbes, whose political arguments are animated by imaginary 
or speculative claims about the origins and trajectories of social life. Post-
structuralists, however, are careful to represent their post-metaphysical views as an 
“onto-story whose persuasiveness is always at issue and can never be fully 
disentangled from an interpretation of present historical circumstances” (White 2000, 
10–11; see also Deleuze and Guattari 1977). 
 What post-structuralists try to do without is not the origin story by means of which 
political theory has always motivated its readers, nor the wagers by way of which it 
offers hope. Rather, post-structuralists seek to do without the ends or guarantees (such 
as faith, or progress, or virtue) which have enabled some enviable achievements (such 
as the broadening of human rights), but in the name of which cruelties have also been 
committed (in the so-called “developing” world, or in the West against non-believers 
and non-conformists).7 These ends or guarantees have sometimes enabled political 
theorists to evade full responsibility for the conclusions they seek, by claiming the 
goals or values in question are called for by some extra-human source, like god or 
nature. 
3 POLITICAL THEORY AND THE GLOBAL TURN 
Liberalism has demonstrated an almost unprecedented capacity for absorbing its 
competitors, aided by the collapse of its rival, Marxism, but also by its own virtuosity 
in reinventing itself and incorporating key elements from opposing traditions. Yet this 
is not a triumphalist liberalism, of the kind proclaimed in Fukuyama's (1989) “end of 
history,” which celebrated the victory of liberal capitalism in the real-world 
competition of political-economic models. The paradox is that liberalism's absorption 
of some of its competitors has been accompanied by increasing anxiety about the way 
                                                 
 7 On the role of progress in India, see Mehta (1999). On the fate of non-
conformists in Rawls, for example, see Honig (1993). 
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Western liberalism illegitimately centers itself. The much discussed shift in the work 
of Rawls is one classic illustration of this, for while the Rawls of A Theory of Justice 
(1971) seemed to be setting out “the” principles of justice that would be acceptable to 
any rational individual in any social context, the Rawls of Political Liberalism (1993) 
stressed the reasonableness of a variety of “comprehensive doctrines,” including those 
that could be non-liberal, and the Rawls of The Law of Peoples (1999) encouraged us 
to recognize the “decency” of hierarchical, non-liberal societies that are nonetheless 
well-ordered and respect a certain minimum of human rights. 
 Having won over many erstwhile critics in the metropolitan centres, liberals now 
more readily acknowledge that there are significant traditions of thought beyond those 
that helped form Western liberalism. They acknowledge, moreover, that the grounds 
for rejecting these other traditions are more slippery than previously conceived. The 
critique of “foundationalism” (for example, Rorty 1989) used to arouse heated debate 
among political theorists. Many were incensed at the suggestion that their claims 
about universal justice, equality, or human rights had no independent grounding, and 
accused the skeptics of abandoning normative political theory (see, for example, 
Benhabib et al. 1995). In the course of the 1990s, however, anti-foundationalism 
moved from being a contested minority position to something more like the 
consensus. Post-structuralist critiques of foundationalism led to liberalism's late 
twentieth-century announcement that it is “post-foundational” (Rawls 1993; 
Habermas 1996)—although with no fundamental rethinking of the key commitments 
of liberal theory. In the wake, however, of Rawls and Habermas disavowing 
metaphysical support for their (clearly normative) projects, Western political theorists 
have increasingly acknowledged the historical contingency of their own schools of 
thought; and this is generating some small increase in interest in alternative traditions. 
The awareness of these traditions does not, of itself, signal a crisis of confidence in 
liberal principles (arch anti-foundationalist, Richard Rorty, certainly has no trouble 
declaring himself a liberal), but it does mean that political theory now grapples more 
extensively with questions of moral universalism and cultural or religious difference 
(e.g. Euben 1999; Parekh 2000; Honig 2001). 
 The explosion of writing on multiculturalism—largely from the 1990s—is 
particularly telling here. Multiculturalism is, by definition, concerned with the 
multiplicity of cultures: it deals with what may be radical differences in values, belief-
systems, and practices, and has been especially preoccupied with the rights, if any, of 
non-liberal groups in liberal societies. The “problem” arises because liberalism is not 
the only doctrine on offer, and yet the way the problem is framed—as a question of 
toleration, or the rights of minorities, or whether groups as well as individuals can 
hold rights—remains quintessentially liberal. Will Kymlicka (1995) famously 
defended group rights for threatened cultural communities on the grounds that a 
secure cultural context is necessary to individual autonomy, such that the very 
importance liberals attach to individual autonomy requires them to support 
multicultural policies. His version of liberal multiculturalism has been widely 
criticized (see Spinner-Halev and Kukathas in this volume); and many continue to see 
liberalism as at odds with multiculturalism (for example, Okin 1998, 2002; Barry 
2001). But in analyzing the “problem” of multiculturalism through the paradigm of 
liberalism, Kymlicka very much exemplifies the field of debate. Liberalism 
simultaneously makes itself the defining tradition and notices the awkwardness in 
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this. Its very dominance then seems to spawn an increasing awareness of traditions 
other than itself. 
 It is not entirely clear why this has happened now (liberalism, after all, has been 
around for many years) but that useful shorthand, globalization, must provide at least 
part of the explanation. It is difficult to sustain a belief in liberalism as the only 
tradition, or in secularism as the norm, when the majority of the world's population is 
patently unconvinced by either (Gray 1995, 1998). And although political theorists 
have drawn heavily on the liberal tradition in their explorations of human rights or 
global justice, the very topics they address require them to think about the specificity 
of Western political thought. Political theory now roams more widely than in the past, 
pondering accusations of ethno-centricity, questioning the significance of national 
borders, engaging in what one might almost term a denationalization of political 
theory. That description is an overstatement, for even in addressing explicitly global 
issues, political theory draws on concepts that are national in origin, and the 
assumptions written into them often linger into their more global phase. Terms like 
nation or state are not going to disappear from the vocabulary of political theory—but 
the kinds of shift Chris Brown (in this volume) discerns from international to global 
conceptions of justice are being played out in many corners of contemporary political 
thought. 
 It is hard to predict how this will develop, although the combination of a dominant 
liberalism with a concern that Western liberalism may have illegitimately centered 
itself looks unstable, and it seems probable that pockets of resistance and new 
alternatives to liberalism will therefore gain strength in future years. It seems certain 
that moves to reframe political theory in a more self-consciously global context will 
gather pace. This is already evident in the literature on equality, democracy, and 
social justice, where there is increasing attention to both international and global 
dimensions. It is also becoming evident in new ways of theorizing religion. Religion 
has been discussed so far in political theory mainly in the context of the “problem” of 
religious toleration, with little attention to the internal structure of religious beliefs. 
But other dimensions are now emerging, including new ways of understanding the 
politics of secularism, and closer examination of the normative arguments developed 
within different religions. It seems likely that new developments in science 
(particularly those associated with bio-genetics) will provide political theorists with 
difficult challenges in the coming decade, especially as regards our understanding of 
the boundaries between public and private, and the prospects for equality. And while 
the prospect of a more participatory or deliberative democracy remains elusive, we 
can perhaps anticipate an increasing focus on the role of pleasure and passion in 
political activism. 
 It is harder to predict what will happen in the continuing battle to incorporate issues 
of gender and “race” into mainstream political theory. The contributors to this 
Handbook include people who have played significant roles in the development of 
feminist political theory, but it is notable that few have chosen to make feminism 
and/or gender central to their essays. The optimistic take on this is that gender is no 
longer a distinct and separate topic, but now a central component in political thought. 
The more pessimistic take is suggested in the final comment of Linda Zerilli's chapter: 
that the attempt to think politics outside an exclusively gender-centered frame may 
end up reproducing the blind spots associated with the earlier canon of political 
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thought. The likely developments as regards “race” are also unclear. We can 
anticipate that racial inequality will continue to figure in important ways in 
discussions of affirmative action or political representation, but the explosion of work 
on multiculturalism has focused more on “culture” or ethnicity, and political theory 
has not engaged in a thoroughgoing way with the legacies of colonialism or slavery. 
The essays in this Handbook suggest, however, that important new developments are 
under way. 
4 POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE: CURRENT TRAJECTORIES 
We noted earlier the sometimes difficult relationship between political theory and the 
rest of political science. We return to this here, but more with a view to areas of 
cooperation. In addition to its interdisciplinary locations, political theory has a place 
in the standard contemporary line-up of sub-fields in political science, alongside 
comparative politics, international relations, public policy, and the politics of one's 
own country. Here and there, methodology, public administration, political 
psychology, and public law might be added; and truly adventurous departments may 
stretch to political economy and environmental politics. All these sub-fields have a 
theoretical edge that potentially connects with the preoccupations of political theory. 
These connections confirm the importance of political theory to the rest of political 
science. 
 International relations has a well-defined sub-sub-field of international relations 
(IR) theory, and we have noted that this is defined largely in terms of the three grand 
positions of realism, constructivism, and liberalism. Confusingly, liberalism in IR is 
not quite the same as liberalism in political theory. In IR theory, liberalism refers to 
the idea that actors can co-operate and build international institutions for the sake of 
mutual gains; it is therefore linked to a relatively hopeful view of the international 
system. Realism, in contrast, assumes that states maximize security in an anarchy 
where violent conflict is an ever-present possibility. Constructivism points to the 
degree to which actors, interests, norms, and systems are social constructions that can 
change over time and place. Each of these provides plenty of scope for engagement 
with political theory—even if these possibilities are not always realized. Despite its 
differences, IR liberalism connects with the liberalism of political theory in their 
shared Lockean view of how governing arrangements can be established, and when it 
comes to specifying principles for the construction of just and legitimate international 
institutions. Realism is explicitly grounded in the political theory of Thomas Hobbes, 
interpreting the international system in Hobbesian “state of nature” terms. Thucydides 
has also been an important if contestable resource for realism (Monoson and Loriaux 
1998). Constructivism has been represented (for example, by Price and Reus-Smit 
1998) as consistent with Habermasian critical theory. As Scheuerman (this volume) 
points out, critical theory has reciprocated, in that it now sees the international system 
as the crucial testing ground for its democratic prescriptions. Normative theory is 
currently flourishing in international relations, and many of the resources for this are 
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provided by political theory (Cochran 1999), with postmodernists, Rawlsian liberals, 
feminists, and critical theorists making particularly important contributions.8 
 The connections between comparative politics and political theory are harder to 
summarize because many of the practitioners of the former are area specialists with 
only a limited interest in theory. Those comparativists who use either large-n 
quantitative studies or small-n comparative case studies are often more interested in 
simple explanatory theory, one source of which is rational choice theory. But there are 
also points of engagement with political theory as understood in this Handbook. The 
comparative study of social movements and their relationships with the state has 
drawn upon the idea of the public sphere in democratic political theory, and vice 
versa. Accounts of the role of the state in political development have drawn upon 
liberal constitutionalist political theory. More critical accounts of the state in 
developing societies have drawn upon Marxist theory. In the last two decades 
democratization has been an important theme in comparative politics, and this work 
ought to have benefited from a dialogue with democratic theory. Unfortunately this 
has not happened. Studies of democratization generally work with a minimalist 
account of democracy in terms of competitive elections, developed in the 1940s by 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942), ignoring the subsequent sixty years of democratic theory. 
Recent work on race and diaspora studies in a comparative context is perhaps a more 
promising site of connection, invoking Tocqueville (see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1999; Hanchard 2003). And theorists working on multiculturalism and race have been 
especially attentive to comparative politics questions about the variety of 
governmental forms and their interaction with cultural difference (Carens 2000; 
Kymlicka 2001; Taylor 1994; Gilroy 2000). 
 Methodology might seem the sub-field least likely to engage with political theory, 
and if methodology is thought of in terms of quantitative techniques alone, that might 
well be true. However, methodology is also home to reflection on what particular 
sorts of methods can do. Here, political theorists are in an especially good position to 
mediate between the philosophy of social science on the one hand, and particular 
methods on the other. Taylor (1979) and Ball (1987) point to the inevitable moment 
of interpretation in the application of all social science methods, questioning the 
positivist self-image of many of those who deploy quantitative methods. The 
interdisciplinarity that characterizes so much political theory provides especially 
fruitful material for methodological reflection. 
 Public policy is at the “applied” end of political science, but its focus on the 
relationship between disciplinary knowledge and political practice invites contribution 
from political theory; and many political theorists see themselves as clarifying the 
normative principles that underpin policy proposals. From Rawls and Dworkin 
onwards, work on principles of justice and equality has carried definite policy 
implications regarding taxation, public expenditure on health, the treatment of those 
with disabilities, and so on. While it has rarely been possible to translate the theories 
                                                 
 8 See, for example, Pogge (2002), Lynch (1999), Connolly (1991), der Derian 
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into specific recommendations (Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market and 
Amartya Sen's theory of capabilities are often said to be especially disappointing in 
this respect), they are undoubtedly directed at public policy. Normative reasoning 
applied to public policy largely defines the content of Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
though this reasoning involves moral philosophy as much as or more than political 
theory.9 Political theorists working on questions of democracy and representation 
have also drawn direct policy conclusions regarding the nature of electoral systems or 
the use of gender quotas to modify patterns of representation (Phillips 1995). 
 Policy evaluation and design are important parts of the public policy sub-field, and 
both require normative criteria to provide standards by which to evaluate actual or 
potential policies. Again, political theory is well placed to illuminate such criteria and 
how one might think about handling conflicts between them (for example, when 
efficiency and justice appear to point in different directions). It is also well placed to 
explore the discourse aspects of public policy, an aspect that has been an especial 
interest of the Theory, Policy, and Society group of the American Political Science 
Association. Among the linkages this group develops are those between deliberative 
democratic theory and policy analysis, between the logic of political argument and 
interventions by analysts and advocates in policy processes, and between interpretive 
philosophy of social science and policy evaluation (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). 
 Cutting across all the sub-fields of political science in recent decades has been 
rational choice theory, grounded in microeconomic assumptions about the wellsprings 
of individual behavior. Indeed, to some of its practitioners, rational choice is what 
should truly be described as political theory. For these practitioners, rational choice 
theory is “positive” political theory, value free, and geared toward explanation, not 
prescription. This claim does not hold up: as explanatory theory, rational choice 
theory is increasingly regarded as a failure (Green and Shapiro 1994). But many 
believe that it is very useful nevertheless. Game theory, for example, can clarify what 
rationality is in particular situations (Johnson 1991), thereby illuminating one of the 
perennial questions in political theory. And despite the frequent description of rational 
choice theory as value free, it has provided for plenty of normative theorizing among 
its practitioners. Arch-positivist Riker (1982b) deploys Arrow's social choice theory 
to argue that democracy is inherently unstable and meaningless in the outcomes it 
produces, and uses this to back a normative argument on behalf of a minimal liberal 
democracy that allows corrupt or incompetent rules to be voted out—but nothing 
more. The conclusions of rational choice theory are often bad news for democracy 
(Barry and Hardin 1982); but it is possible to reinterpret this edifice in terms of 
critical theory, as showing what would happen if everyone behaved according to 
microeconomic assumptions. The political challenge then becomes one of how to curb 
this destructive behavioral proclivity (Dryzek 1992). There are many other 
connections between rational choice theory and political theory, exploratory as well as 
critical; we only touch on them in this Handbook because they will be more 
                                                 




extensively reviewed in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, also in this 
series. 
 Leading comparativist Bo Rothstein (2005) has expressed the worry that the 
empirical arm of the discipline has lost its moral compass. To use his running 
example, its “technically competent barbarians” would have no defense against lining 
up in support of a political force like Nazism, should that be expedient. Rothstein 
himself sees the remedy in political theory: “The good news is that, unlike other 
disciplines, I think we have the solution within our own field of research. This, I 
believe, lies in reconnecting the normative side of the discipline—that is, political 
philosophy—with the positive/empirical side” (2005, 10). Despite the likelihood of 
some resistance to this from both sides of the divide, the examples discussed above 
suggest that such connection (or reconnection) is indeed possible. 
5 ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK 
We turn now to the way we have organized this Handbook. Part II, “Contemporary 
Currents,” assesses the impact, and considers the likely future trajectory, of literature 
that proved especially influential in framing debate through the last decades of the 
twentieth century and opening years of the twenty-first. The selection is not, of 
course, meant to sum up what political theory has been about over that period: if it did 
that, there would be little need for the remaining essays in the Handbook. We have 
included three figures—Rawls, Habermas, and Foucault—whose work has so shaped 
the field that it became possible for a time to label (although somewhat misleadingly) 
other political theorists by their adherence to one of the three. We have also included 
three thematic styles of theory—feminism, pluralism, and linguistic approaches—that 
have sought (successfully or not) to refocus debate in a different direction. The 
theorists and themes addressed in this section are ones that have particularly marked 
out this moment in political theory, and the chapters assess their continuing influence. 
 Part III, “The Legacy of the Past,” focuses on historical work in political thought. 
As James Farr notes in his chapter, the history of political thought has been a staple of 
university instruction since the end of the nineteenth century, long recognized as a 
branch of political theory. But the role and object of historical inquiry has been much 
debated in recent decades, and the idea that one should search the classical texts for 
answers to the perennial problems of political life has been subjected to especially 
searching critique. Some theorists have been happy to jettison any study of historical 
traditions, regarding it as a merely antiquarian exercise. But the greater attention now 
given to context—to what can and cannot be thought at any given period in history—
has also enabled radically new readings of political thought. The essays in this section 
can give only a taste of the wealth of scholarship in this field, and have been selected 
with an eye to that continuing discussion about the legacy of the past and its 
relationship with the present. They include a meta-level discussion of the relationship 
between political theory and the discipline of history; a disciplinary history of the 
history of political thought; and essays on a number of historical traditions that have 
been subject to significant re-evaluation and reinterpretation in the recent literature. 
 Questions of context are spatial as well as temporal, for even the most abstract of 
political theories cannot transcend its location, and the issues with which theorists 
become preoccupied reflect the histories and concerns of the worlds in which they 
 23 
live. The chapters in Part IV, “Political Theory in the World,” make matters of 
location more explicit. They explore differences, misconceptions, and mutual 
influences between Western and non-Western political traditions, with the latter 
represented here by Confucianism and Islam, and look at how ideas of America on the 
one hand and Europe on the other enter into and shape ideas of democracy, 
representation, and nation. This section should be understood as a gesture, but just 
that, towards de-centering what has come to be known as Anglo-American theory. 
This Handbook of political theory is published in Oxford and written in the English 
language, but one modest objective, nonetheless, is to highlight the specificity of all 
work in political theory, and the way the questions addressed reflect particular 
histories and locations. 
 The chapters in Part V, “State and People,” combine historical analysis of the 
shifting understandings of state and people with normative explorations of 
democracy, constitutionalism, and representation. As the essays indicate, the last 
decades have been a time of very considerable innovation. For much of the twentieth 
century, democracy was conceptualized as a matter of universal suffrage (sometimes 
quaintly equated with one man one vote), competitive party elections, and the rule of 
law. The outstanding problems were not thought to be theoretical, but centered on 
how to spread this conception more widely; and much of the work on democracy 
(often comparative, or dealing with the conditions for democratization) was carried 
out by political scientists rather than theorists. This picture has since changed 
radically, with a complex of concerns about the nature and limits of constitutionalism, 
the exclusions practised under the name of democracy, and the possibilities of wider 
and deeper practices of popular control. As reflects the breadth of these debates, this 
is one of the largest sections in the Handbook. 
 Part VI, “Justice, Equality, and Freedom,” evokes the combination of concerns that 
runs through the work of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and the liberal egalitarian 
tradition: the idea, for example, that justice is a matter of treating people as equals 
rather than treating them equally; or that egalitarians must recognize individuals as 
responsible agents, accountable for their own choices. The chapters in this section 
reflect that legacy, but also problematize it by reference to arguments drawn from the 
feminist literature and work on recognition. They include essays on the relationship 
between equality and impartiality, and the relationship between treating people as 
equals and recognizing them as different; and address the questions about individual 
responsibility that became central to the literature on justice and equality through the 
last decades. The literature on historical injustice goes back further, but has drawn 
new sustenance from debates on reparations for slavery and the treatment of 
indigenous peoples. 
 Part VII, “Pluralism, Multiculturalism, and Nationalism,” reflects areas of debate 
that have proved particularly fruitful over the last thirty years. As noted earlier in our 
introduction, it also reflects explorations of the implications and/or limits of the 
liberal tradition. The literature on multiculturalism has its precursor in a sociological 
literature on cultural pluralism, but as normative political theory dates from the 1980s. 
Theoretical work on toleration or the right of nations to self-determination is not, of 
course, new. But the recent synthesis of liberalism with nationalism is more 
unexpected, as is the reframing of long-established liberal principles of toleration to 
take account of issues of identity as well as belief. This last point is part of what 
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unites the chapters in this section. All engage with arguments that have been central to 
the liberal tradition, but in relation to the new questions that arise when people make 
claims on the basis of identity. The authors reach very different conclusions—
including, at its most heretical, that the pursuit of justice may not be such a 
compelling concern. 
 Part VIII, “Claims in a Global Context,” takes this from the national to the global 
level. It explores the debates that have developed between seemingly universal 
discourses of secularism or human rights and more relativist emphases on cultural 
difference; examines the connection between multicultural and post-colonial theory; 
and considers the challenges globalization presents to current conceptions of justice. 
Although justice has been at the heart of recent debates in normative political theory, 
the dominant conceptions have been very state-centered—and often very Western 
state-centered. The chapters in this section consider what happens in the move from 
national to global—and what theoretical possibilities become available if the center of 
gravity shifts from the Western to non-Western world. 
 Part IX, “The Body Politic,” takes what has long been employed as a metaphor for 
the political community at its face (or bodily) value, and uses it to engage with new 
areas of theoretical debate. These include the way the body itself has been politicized 
in the theoretical literature, including in the literature on self-ownership; and the way 
the social “body” has been politicized, as in the discussion of crises and paranoia. A 
number of the chapters in this section begin with changes in the social world: the 
impact of global migration, for example, and the way this alters our understanding of 
the individual subject; the development of new medical technologies, and the 
dilemmas these present about organ transplants or genetic engineering; the 
developments in surveillance technology combined with radical changes in the 
relation between the sexes, and the challenge this poses to our understanding of the 
relationship between public and private space. This reconceptualizing of the political 
space owes much to the influence of feminism, as do a number of the essays 
themselves. 
 We have argued in our introduction that political theory is something of a mongrel 
sub-discipline, made up of many traditions, approaches, and styles of thought, and 
increasingly characterized by its borrowing from feminist and critical theory, film 
theory, popular culture, mass media, behavioral science, and economics. These 
tendencies will be evident throughout the chapters in the Handbook, but are most 
directly addressed in Part X, “Testing the Boundaries.” Here, we include essays that 
set political theory in dialogue with work in cultural studies, political economy, social 
theory, and the environment. The current academy confronts two opposing trends. 
One draws the boundaries of each discipline ever more tightly, sometimes as part of a 
bid for higher status, sometimes in the (not totally implausible) belief that this is the 
route to deeper and more systematic knowledge. Another looks to the serendipitous 
inspirations that can come through cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary work; or 
more simply and modestly, realizes that there may be much to learn from other areas 
of study. It is hard to predict which of these will win out—and most likely, both will 
continue in uneasy combination for many years to come. The essays in this section 
reflect the importance we attach to the second trend. 
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 All the Handbooks in this series end with what is perhaps unhappily termed the 
“Old and New” section. In this case, it provides the opportunity for two highly 
influential but very different political theorists—Arlene Saxonhouse and William 
Connolly—to reflect on their experiences and perceptions of theory as it has changed, 
developed, improved, and/or worsened in the course of their careers. Where other 
contributors were asked to weave their own distinctive take on a topic into essays that 
would also work as overviews of the sub-field, our last contributors were encouraged 
to write from a more personal angle. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Ours is not the first or only handbook of political theory. We believe this Oxford 
Handbook is distinctive in its exploration of political theory's edges as well as its 
several cores, its global emphasis, and its contemplation of the challenges that 
contemporary social and technological change present to the field. Political theory is a 
lively, pluralistic, and contested field, and we invite readers to construct their own 
summary interpretations and embark on their own imaginative theorizing by sampling 
the wide variety of options on the palette that follows. 
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